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The Dangerous New US Consensus on China and the Future of
US-China Relations
Mel Gurtov and Mark Selden
The trade war and technological  competition
with China are symptomatic of a much larger
issue:  a  dangerous  gridlock  in  US-China
relations  that  may  become  permanent,  with
dire  consequences  not  just  for  the  two
countries’  economies  but  also  for  the  global
economy  and  quite  possibly  East  Asia’s  and
international  security.  Martin  Wolf,  Financial
Times columnist, is right to conclude: “Across-
the-board  rivalry  with  China  is  becoming an
organising principle  of  US economic,  foreign
and  security  policies.”1  The  fact  that  this
conflict  has  occurred  at  a  time  of  trade,
investment, and security disputes between the
US and its major allies, US-Russia tensions, and
US  military  interventions  across  the  Middle
East  and  Central  Asia,  heightens  global
instability.
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan charged
that  Japan  “is  stealing  our  future”  “by
counterfeiting  or  copying  of  American
products.”2 Now the president’s target is China,
with the anti-China chorus including not only
leaders of Trump’s national security team but
also his  former senior adviser and arch cold
warrior,  Stephen  Bannon,  and  a  range  of
national security, economic and Asia specialists
across the political spectrum.3 In 2011 Trump
the businessman was decrying China’s unfair
trade and technology practices, calling China
an enemy, and saying that if he were president,
he would be able to force China to back down
because  it  needs  us  more  than  we  need
it.4 Today China looms so much larger—central
to US and global trade and investment, but also
a  partner  in  critical  relationships  with  many
other countries, including major US allies such
as  South  Korea,  Japan,  Australia,  and  the
European Union.5
We argue that to make China the number-one
threat to US national security, as Trump would
have  it,6  is  not  merely  an  exaggeration  and
misunderstanding  of  China’s  ambitions  and
capabilities.  It  is  a  dangerous  basis  for  US
foreign policy, one that is inseparable from the
Trump  administration’s  broader  agenda  that
includes embrace of useful dictators, disregard
for  human  rights  and  international  law,
diplomacy reliant on threats and sanctions, and
overturning  or  weakening  of  international
treaty  commitments.
 
The Rising Tide of Anti-China Sentiment
Washington politicians in both parties are as
one in talking up the China threat and how to
counter it. A bipartisan consensus in Congress
seems  to  have  concluded  that  the  era  of
engaging China is over. More surprising is an
emerg ing  consensus  among  pub l i c
intellectuals, including China specialists as well
as many in both the conservative and liberal
media,  who  embrace  the  view  of  Trump’s
intelligence  community  that  China  is  the
principal threat to US national security.7  The
New York Times, for instance, editorialized on
July 21 that “President Trump is correct to try
to establish a sounder relationship with Russia
and peel it away from China.” And while the
Washington  Post  has  called  for  a  return  to
engaging China, it nevertheless found that “Mr.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
 APJ | JF 17 | 15 | 5
2
Xi’s regime has shattered the hopeful vision”
that  China  would  be  “a  responsible  global
player.”8 In fact, a hard line on China seems to
be  the  single  policy  on  which  liberals  and
conservatives  are  in  general  agreement  with
o n e  a n o t h e r  a n d  w i t h  P r e s i d e n t
Trump.9 American public opinion has followed,
with a significant shift toward seeing rivalry as
the appropriate motif of US-China relations.10
Xi Jinping (left) and Donald Trump
The  voices  so  stridently  attacking  China
typically  ignore  the  fact  that  the  US  under
Trump  has  torpedoed  internat iona l
agreements, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP)  to  the  Paris  climate  accord  and  the
Intermediate  Nuclear  Forces  (INF)  treaty,
defied international law by withdrawing from
the Iran nuclear agreement and carrying out
economic warfare against Tehran, and ordered
that his  trade representative seek to remove
China’s status as a developing country in the
World Trade Organization.11 These actions have
undermined US leadership and cemented the
Chinese conviction that it is now Beijing’s time
to define regional and global responsibilities.
Supplementing  its  position  as  the  world’s
second  largest  economy  and  leader  in
international trade, China has now moved with
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to lead the
world’s  largest  aid  program,  one  that  has
secured  the  active  participation  of  leading
nations, including US allies. Beijing now has its
eyes  trained  not  just  on  trade  and  climate
change  but  also  on  economic  development
strategy, sustainable energy, and international
aid.
Xi  Jinping’s  China  has  certainly  done  things
that  merit  strong  criticism,  notably  the
incarceration and “reeducation” of  roughly  a
million Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims, the
communist  party’s  assault  on  independent
lawyers, journalists, and labor rights activists,
and militarizing of disputed islands in the South
China Sea. Still, there are compelling reasons
for  seeking  common  ground  with  China—on
trade, energy, missiles, and the climate crisis,
for  example—identifying  financial  and
technological complementarities, and averting
a breakdown in US-China relations that would
undermine  the  international  economy  and
could  lead  to  war
This growing convergence of opinion between
the liberal  establishment and Trump and the
Republican Party over the threat of China does
not  mean  that  there  is  an  identity  of  views
a b o u t  h o w  b e s t  t o  c o n f r o n t  t h a t
threat.12  Whereas  the  Trump  administration
and  Republicans  in  Congress  view  China  in
ideological, military, and trade terms, liberals
seem more concerned with the technological
and  human  rights  elements.13  But  the  two
camps coalesce around the urgency of halting
what  they  see  as  China ’s  predatory
commercial,  industrial  and  technological
strategy  and  its  al leged  spying  at  US
universities  and  laboratories.  Perhaps  most
importantly,  they  commonly  see  China  in
national  security  terms—threatening  US
hegemony. In short, they share a commitment
to ensuring that the US remains the number-
one power in the world.
China specialists could once be counted among
China's best friends, not as fellow travelers but
as  people  knowledgeable  enough  about  the
country  and  its  history  to  understand  the
difference between expansionism and defensive
behavior  and  the  importance  of  seeing  the
world through Chinese eyes.  Many offered a
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balanced  view  of  China's  domestic  reforms
while  recognizing  a  range  of  complementary
interests linking the US and China and China’s
critical role in stabilizing the hegemony of the
US dollar through its purchase of $1.1 trillion
in US treasuries,  fully  27 percent of  the US
debt  held  by  foreign  countries.14  China
specialists  consistently  warned  against
confusing  China's  intentions  with  its
capabilities. They also pointed to the need to
maintain active engagement at every level with
Chinese counterparts, drew a line between the
repressive state and an increasingly mobile and
market-oriented  society,  and  above  all
emphasized the value of a realistic approach to
US-China relations that served the interests of
both countries.
Today,  however,  many  former  sympathizers
seem  disappointed  in  China’s  failure  to
embrace liberal  values  and open its  political
system  to  democratic  reforms.  The  30 th
anniversary  of  the  1989  suppression  of  the
democracy  movement  provided  an  enormous
boost  to  critics,  with  an  outpouring  of
commentaries  and  photographs  from  former
student  leaders  and  demonstrators  in  the
United  States,  Europe  and  beyond.  Nicholas
Kristof, who was at Tiananmen on 6/4, writes
that “those of us who witnessed Beijing Spring
are  confident  that  eventually,  unpredictably,
the tide of freedom will roll in again.”15 Such
disappointment  stems  in  good  part  from  a
misreading of the nature of the PRC’s reforms
since 1978. What the Chinese Communist Party
calls “political reform” involves personnel and
procedural  changes  designed  to  facilitate
economic  growth—anti-corruption  drives,
emphasis  on  professionalism  and  technical
expertise, greater separation of party and state,
and  above  all  political  stability—without
sacrificing (indeed, under Xi Jinping, moving to
strengthen) the party’s supremacy in all walks
of life. 
Some  liberals  jumped  on  the  anti-China
bandwagon  after  Vice  President  Mike  Pence
delivered  an  in-depth  indictment  of  that
country on October 4, 2018.16 Pence described
China’s interference in US politics as a “whole-
of-government”  threat,  a  point  endorsed  by
(among others) Winston Lord, the former US
ambassador to China. But Pence’s speech was
full  of  historical  inaccuracies  about  the  US-
China  relationship,  unwarranted  braggadocio
about  America’s  critical  role  in  China’s  rise,
and  dangerous  rhetoric  about  Chinese
“aggressiveness.”  Above  all,  Pence  seriously
misinterpreted  China’s  international  strategy
and objectives, making it seem as if Xi Jinping
is  committed to  promoting revolution abroad
a n d  u n d e r m i n i n g  d e m o c r a c y
worldwide.17  Actually,  the  latest  Chinese
national strategy report indicates that domestic
threats,  namely  “separatism,”  are  the
leadership’s  primary  security  concern.  The
report  also  acknowledges  weaknesses  in  the
People’s  Liberation  Army  that  make  it  a
regional rather than a global military force like
that of the United States.18
 
Trade War: A Sign of Things to Come
The trade war, as the public face of US-China
conflict,  is  particularly  worrisome because  it
reflects a perception problem that might make
a bad situation worse. What Trump is doing in
imposing blanket tariffs on virtually all Chinese
imports  is  entirely  in  keeping  with  his
aggressive  business  style:  threaten  one’s
adversary,  avoid  making  concessions,  don’t
back down, and above all win. The trouble with
that approach is that China has a long history
of  dealing  with  threats  from  powerful
adversaries.  By typically denouncing them as
“bullying” and “humiliation,” Chinese leaders,
most  notably  during  the  anti-Japanese
resistance of the 1930s and 1940s, successfully
mobilized  popular  resistance.  Neither  Trump
nor,  it  seems,  any  of  his  advisers,  has  the
slightest  understanding  of  the  history  and
power of Chinese nationalism as exhibited in
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China’s struggle against Japanese and Western
imperialism, or its clash with the US in Korea
and Vietnam from the 1950s, or its break with
the Soviet Union in the 1960s. 
Secretary  of  State  Mike  Pompeo  thinks  the
struggle with Huawei Technologies Company is
ideological—either  “Western  values”  or
communist  values  will  rule  the  internet,  he
says—while  Kiron  Skinner,  the  director  of
policy planning at the State Department, views
the China rivalry, strangely, as a “fight with a
really  different  civilization  and  a  different
ideology.”19  The  Trump administration  seems
oblivious to the Xi Jinping leadership’s repeated
references to a “new Long March,” alluding to
the guerrilla struggles that led to the defeat of
Japan invaders and the founding of the People’s
Republic—that is, overcoming difficulties, and
defending China’s economic development path,
which it now defines as a “core interest.”20 The
administration  also  underestimates  China’s
alternatives to giving in on commercial issues,
notably  the  Regional  Comprehensive  Trade
Partnership it initiated, which links twenty-five
Asia-Pacific members,21 and Beijing’s ability to
punish  (according  to  China’s  commerce
ministry)  “unreliable”  foreign companies  that
“do not follow market rules, violate the spirit of
contracts, blockade and stop supplying Chinese
companies  for  noncommercial  reasons,  and
seriously  damage  the  legitimate  rights  and
interests of Chinese companies.” The real cost
here  is  not  just  to  business,  but  to  the  US
reputation,  for  paradoxically  China  can  now
pose  as  the  principal  defender  not  only  of
global  markets  but  also  of  the  multinational
global order that the US had long pioneered
and now scorns.
 
The Costs of Demonizing China
Beyond  commercial  ties,  Americans  and
Chinese should recognize that we need each
other when it comes to effectively confronting
global problems including nuclear proliferation,
climate  crisis,  humanitarian  crises,  the
provision  of  sustainable  energy  sources,  and
bringing an end to the Korean War.  Neither
country is in a position to contain, much less
resolve, any of these problems on its own. As
Ana  Swanson  and  Keith  Bradsher  argue,
America  First  is  an  aggressive  vision  of
American power that  seeks  to  upend a  rival
system  that  has  delivered  prosperity  for  its
people and has put China on course to be the
world’s largest economy.22 We must rise above
the  “win-at-all-costs”  approach  and  rivalry
between  the  United  States  and  China  to
recognize the two nations’ interdependence.
The list of disputed issues between the US and
China  includes  confrontations  over  Taiwan,
Tibet,  and  the  South  China  Sea,  as  well  as
policy  differences  over  North  Korea,  Russia,
Korea, Iran, and Africa. US policies on many of
these issues not only risk worsening them, they
also threaten to drive the Chinese into closer
relationships with countries that share Beijing’s
opposition to those policies, especially Russia,
with which China now has a “comprehensive
strategic partnership of coordination.” On Iran,
for  example,  Xi  Jinping  has  rejected  the  US
demand that countries stop importing Iran’s oil.
He declared that “China and Russia’s views and
positions on the Iran nuclear issue are highly
aligned” and called on “all relevant parties to
remain rational and exercise restraint, step up
dialogue  and  consultations  and  lower  the
temperature on the present tense situation.”23
The  growing  US-China  tension  is  affecting
scientific and educational exchanges, including
r e c i p r o c a l  v i s a  d e n i a l s  f o r
scholars.24  Particularly  pernicious  is  the
officially-inspired  suspicion  of  Chinese
scientists,  including  Americans  of  Chinese
origin,  many  of  whom  are  working  at  US
universities  and  laboratories.  With  little
evidence, these scientists and doctoral students
are being cast as security risks. While a few
cases  of  espionage  have  emerged,  visiting
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Chinese scientists and technicians have been a
great boon to US research.25 Chinese students
comprise  the  largest  contingent  of  foreign
students  in  the  US—more  than  130,000
graduate students and 148,000 undergraduates
enrolled in 2017-2018—and their ability to pay
full freight keeps afloat many of the colleges
and universities they attend. As the president
of MIT laments, these days anyone of Chinese
ethnicity  “now  feel[s]  unfairly  scrutinized,
stigmatized and on edge” when dealing with
the US government.26
Finally, we must reckon with the cost of ceding
international  leadership  to  China  on
globalization,  multilateralism, and recognition
as  a  “responsible  great  power.”  Trump’s
behavior  has  seriously  undermined  US
leadership—to  China’s  advantage.  While  the
PRC can claim to be a model of restraint on
North  Korea  and  Iran,  for  example,  even
lecturing  Washington  on  its  “unilateral
sanctions”  and  “bullying”  of  Iran,27  the  US
president,  while  reveling  in  high-profile
meetings  with  Xi  Jinping  and  Kim  Jong-un,
keeps China under heavy threat of tariffs, leads
a  leaky  sanctions  campaign  against  North
Korea, and seeks regime change in Iran. As a
result,  if  “America  First”  comes  to  mean
“America  Alone,”  China  may  all  the  more
become  the  go-to  power.  The  dispute  over
Huawei  is  illustrative:  US  pressure  on  its
European  and  Asian  partners  to  reject
Huawei’s 5G technology is matched by China’s
campaign  on  Huawei’s  behalf  to  reject
American pressure.28 Some countries will play
ball with China (like Russia) while others (like
Canada) apparently will bow to US pressures,
as  in  the  grudging  detention  of  a  Huawei
executive  at  US  behest,  an  act  that  has
poisoned Canada’s relations with a major trade
partner.
How the US-China rivalry will play out cannot
be confidently predicted. To be sure, China’s
BRI  has  gained  important  new footholds  for
Beijing in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia,
and even southern Europe on the strength of
large-scale  Chinese  loans.  Will  that  enable
China to establish a new international order?
What seems clear is that the US retreat since
2017  has  left  the  door  open  to  Chinese
predominance in trade and foreign aid.
 
What To Do About China?
At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and
1960s,  liberal  policy toward China called for
“containment without isolation” at a time when
revolution was the “main current” in China’s
foreign policy, the Soviet Union ranked second
to the US as a hegemonic power, and China’s
role in the world economy was inconsequential.
In the current era, what if  US policy toward
China  were  engagement-and-competition?  It
could  distinguish  China  from  Russia  rather
than giving Russia a pass as Trump has done.
Russia, unlike China, has interfered in US and
European  elections,  has  annexed  Ukraine’s
Crimea,  and  supports  an  occupying  force  in
eastern Ukraine. The US would reject the “dual
enemies”  approach  that  ensures  closer  PRC-
Russian  cooperation,  especially  in  military
affairs,  which  mainly  involves  joint  exercises
and  (Russian)  arms  and  military  technology
sales.29  Engagement-and-competition  in  fact
was the US policy toward China from the early
1970s. Today the policy would stress the ties
that bind with China as distinct from those with
Russia, and the advantages to both China and
the  US  of  closer  economic  and  geopolitical
relations.
That  approach,  however,  requires  a  more
realistic perspective on China than the Trump
administration and both political parties favor
today. Ivo Daalder offers a sage observation:
“There is nothing unusual with what China is
doing.  It’s  acting  like  any  great  power
would—using  its  economic  and  military
prowess to extend its political influence to all
corners  of  the  globe.  And quite  naturally,  it
seeks that influence to serve its own interests
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and  purposes.”30  Some  liberals  see  a  threat
precisely there, endorsing Mike Pompeo’s view
that Beijing poses “a new kind of challenge; an
authoritarian  regime  that’s  integrated
economically  into  the West  in  ways that  the
Soviet  Union  never  was.”3 1  This  latter
interpretation of what the administration calls
China’s  “economic  aggression”  ignores  how
strongly the Chinese support the contemporary
international  economic status  quo.  It  fails  to
recognize that China is deeply embedded in the
world  capitalist  system,  has  delivered
remarkable economic gains to its people, and
has no interest in disrupting the basic rules of
the system that are essential to its continued
prosperity.  If  China doesn’t  always play fair,
Daalder argues, the best way to counter it is to
rely on the one arena where China is weakest,
allies:  “America’s  rivalry  with  China  is
inevitable.  But  competition  need  not  lead  to
confrontation. If America works together with
its allies, friends and partners, it can continue
to shape the international order to the benefit
of all.” Trump, Fareed Zakaria reports, rejects
that  approach,  seeking victory in a zero-sum
game that prefers “hardball” to cooperation in
creating a bigger pie.32
Meanwhile,  China’s  American  critics  are  so
absorbed in the trade and technology war that
crucial  issues  in  US-China  relations  are  not
receiving  the  attention  they  deserve.  Just  to
take a few examples: Massive demonstrations
in Hong Kong continuing over several weeks
have led to the suspension of an extradition law
that Beijing supports, a defeat for Xi Jinping.
China’s  direct  military  intervention  is  a
possibility. Yet Trump has reportedly promised
Xi that the US would “tone down” its criticism
of China’s actions in Hong Kong in return for
progress  on  trade talks.33  At  the  same time,
China’s BRI, while demonstrating the appeal of
Beijing’s aid strategy, also raises the possibility
of  unsustainable  debts.  Since  the  aid  is
typically  in  the  form  of  loans,  recipients
sometimes  pay  a  high  price—such  as  Sri
Lanka’s  transfer  of  ownership  of  a  port  to
China  when  it  could  not  pay  up,  Greece’s
agreement  to  majority  Chinese  ownership  of
the historic port of Piraeus in return for loans
and investments, and Cambodia’s agreement to
provide China naval  access to a port  on the
Gulf  of  Thailand to offset  aid.34  China’s  debt
diplomacy may at times conflict with US and
NATO interests. 
On the other hand, China’s increasing reliance
on nuclear energy, along with hydro and solar
power,  makes  it  the  world’s  leader  in
alternative  energy,  offering  opportunities  for
cooperative projects with the United States and
other countries even as it continues to produce
the  world’s  largest  output  of  greenhouse
gas.35 Another potential issue on which to seek
common ground is intermediate-range missiles,
just  one  element  of  a  rapidly  modernizing
Chinese  military  that  worries  the  US Pacific
Command.36 US withdrawal from the INF treaty
was reportedly due in part to China’s growing
arsenal, estimated at 2000 ballistic and cruise
missiles,  mainly  deployed  opposite  Taiwan.
Might  a  US-China  agreement  be  negotiated
that would (for example) cap missile numbers
and types and also meet China’s objections to
the  THAAD missile  defense  system based  in
South Korea? Unless an agreement with China
is reached, the US might test and seek land
basing rights for a new cruise missile system
aimed at China, which would probably ignite an
arms race in East Asia.37
The Trump administration’s relentless pursuit
of an America First agenda with its attack on
China’s trade, technology, and aid policies may
be injuring China,  as  Trump keeps insisting,
but  it  is  also  injuring  the  world  and  US
e c o n o m i e s . 3 8  T r u m p ’ s  o w n
constituents—farmers,  miners,  and  industrial
workers as well  as leading sectors of capital
and  finance—are  or  soon  will  be  among  its
main  victims.  The  simultaneous  pursuit  of
complementarity  and  competition  between
China and the US holds the best route forward
for  the  American,  Chinese  and  world
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economies,  and for the reduction of  tensions
that threaten a war that nobody wants.39  For
Americans,  this  will  mean  abandoning
unrealistic  hopes  that  China  will  change
because of external pressure or the inevitable
attractiveness of Western values and political
models, or that the United States will solve its
problems  of  trade  and  balance  of  payments
imbalance  and  de-industrialization  through
imposing  crippling  tariffs  on  China.  As  the
enormous  outpouring  of  popular  protest  in
Hong  Kong  suggests,  change  in  China  must
come from within, just as it must in the US.
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